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Jurisdiction as Sovereignty over Occupied Palestine: The Case of Khan-al-
Ahmar  
 
Abstract 
In the context of prolonged occupation, it has long been argued that the Israeli Supreme Court, in 
High Court of Justice formation, is facilitating the entrenchment of a permanent regime of 
legalised* control by moving away from a model of exception to ordinary civilian jurisdiction over 
the West Bank. This was recently demonstrated in the Khan-al-Ahmar case, in which a group of 
settlers petitioned the ISC/HCJ demanding the execution of a pending Israeli demolition order 
over a school in a Bedouin village in Palestine. The court sided with the army, deferring to a 
political solution for the transfer of the entire Bedouin community elsewhere. Drawing on existing 
scholarship and the author’s first-hand impressions of the final hearing, this article interprets the 
Khan-al-Ahmar case as an illustration of how the exceptional military nature of the occupation 
has shifted to a permanent regime of legalised control overseen by an ordinary civilian court.  
 
* Please note: in this phrase, ‘legalised’ describes compliance to procedural standards set out 
in existing laws and related judicial practices; it does not refer to elements of substantive 
justice of said laws and judicial practices. 
 
Keywords:  
Palestine, West Bank, jurisdiction, Israeli Supreme Court/High Court of Justice, occupation  
 
   
Jurisdiction as Sovereignty over Occupied Palestine: The Case of Khan-al-Ahmar  August 16 
 Page 2 of 38 
Introduction 
While exiting the courtroom after the final Khan-al-Ahmar hearing of 23rd April 
2014, the legal counsel representing the Bedouins before the Israeli Supreme Court 
in High Court of Justice formation (ISC/HCJ) described the entire trial as 
‘Kafkaesque’. The judges did not give him the opportunity to speak on behalf of his 
Palestinian clients, whose tiny community east of Jerusalem was caught in a legal 
battle between the Israeli state and Israeli settlers over the timings of the 
demolition of the village school to facilitate settlement expansion. And although 
the court did not order the execution of the demolition as the settlers had 
demanded, the Khan-al-Ahmar judgment did not constitute a victory for 
Palestinians. Instead, by deferring to a political solution, the ISC/HCJ reaffirmed its 
full integration within the Israeli institutional framework and, consequently, its 
inherent inability to adjudicate fairly over matters involving Palestinian rights in 
Palestinian territory.     
In Kfar Adumim Community Settlement v Minister of Defense, settler representatives 
of Kfar Adumim petitioned the Israeli Ministry of Defence demanding the 
execution of a pending demolition order over the ‘tyre school’ in the adjacent 
Khan-al-Ahmar Bedouin village (UNRWA, 2009). The settlers argued that the 
makeshift school buildings had not received the proper Israeli planning permission; 
moreover, its location fell within the proposed expansion area of Kfar Adumim, 
granting them standing in the case. The trial was conducted as an ordinary judicial 
review between Israeli citizens (representatives of Kfar Adumim) and the Israeli 
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state (listed as ‘respondents 1-3’: Minister of Defense, Commander of the Central 
Defence, IDF and Israeli Civil Administration). The Bedouin community whose 
school was the object of the dispute was listed in the trial documents as a 
secondary group of respondents (‘respondents 4-6’: Suleiman Ali Arara, 
Muhammad Szliman Alkushran and Ibrahim Hamis Jahalin). The judges ultimately 
sided with the state and did not enforce the demolition order, deferring instead to 
an Israeli plan to relocate the entire Khan-al-Ahmar community to a different 
location in the West Bank. So in effect, the ISC/HCJ reaffirmed that the fate of the 
school as well as the future of this Bedouin community fell squarely within the 
sovereign remit of the Israeli state – be it the army, the courts, or the Knesset – 
regardless of the fact these people were Palestinians living in Palestine.      
The Khan-al-Ahmar case is not exceptional. It illustrates the ISC/HCJ’s role in 
legitimising Israeli control over Palestine, favouring Israeli interests over 
Palestinian rights, a critique proposed for decades (e.g. Shehadeh, 1985; Shamir, 
1990; Sultany, 2014; Weill, 2015). David Kretzmer (2002: 2-3) has suggested that 
‘the main function of the Court has been to legitimize the government’s actions in 
the Territories’, both when the ISC/HCJ sides with the state authorities, and when it 
opposes them (also Shamir, 1990); as such, it plays a crucial role in maintaining and 
upholding the occupation (Kretzmer, 2002; Al-Haq, 2010; Harpaz and Shany, 2010: 
515) alongside military courts (Dinstein, 2009: 132; Arai-Takahasi, 2009: 145-166).  
The framework that underpins the Khan-al-Ahmar case is the ISC/HCJ’s judicial 
review over the actions of state agents, which from the early days of the 
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occupation has extended outside Israeli sovereign territory to cover military 
activities in Palestine (Kretzmer, 2002: 1; 19-21). The ISC/HCJ’s jurisprudence has 
given Palestinians the possibility to petition against actions carried out by the 
Israeli military or under the aegis of the military (Shamir, 1990: 785; Dinstein, 2009: 
25-26, Weill, 2015: 2). But the court has also extended this right to Israelis in 
Palestine: based on a widely criticised interpretation of Art 43 of the Hague 
Regulations, it considers Israeli settlers part of the ‘local population’ (Kretzmer, 
2002: 65), distorting the purpose of international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
disregarding the illegality of transferring parts of the occupying power’s population 
to occupied territories (Art 49(6) Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV)). 
Reflecting on the significance of the Khan-al-Ahmar case, this article considers 
how the ISC/HCJ’s far-reaching and unimpeded jurisdiction over the West Bank and 
Palestinians, teamed with its institutional relationship with the Israeli state, is 
constructing Israeli sovereignty over Palestine in the language of civilian law. More 
generally, this research explores how cases like Khan-al-Ahmar contribute to 
transforming a military occupation into quasi-annexation, to the detriment of 
individual Palestinian rights as well as Palestinian territorial integrity. Drawing 
loosely on the notion of ‘transformative occupation’ furthered by Nehal Bhuta 
(2005) and Adam Roberts (2006), this paper describes the Israeli control over 
Palestine a ‘permanent regime of legalised control’,1 in contrast to the exceptional 
temporary nature of military occupation, which is now paradoxically in its fiftieth 
                                                 
1 In this phrase, ‘legalised’ describes compliance to procedural standards set out in existing laws and 
related judicial practices; it does not refer to elements of substantive justice of said laws and judicial 
practices 
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year. The notion of a permanent regime of legalised control is also distinct from 
both the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction and from sovereignty, although it 
shares many of its features and effects. The Khan-al-Ahmar judgment provides a 
recent example of how the ISC/HCJ implements the permanent regime of legalised 
control over the West Bank, demonstrating how formal proceedings and law 
facilitate the Israeli grip over Palestine, without having to openly resort to armed 
force.  
The Khan-al-Ahmar case provides an illustration of how law, and in particular trials, 
helps mask political abuse in how Israel deals with Palestinian matters. The 
legalistic nature of the Israeli occupation was widely discussed at the 1988 Al-Haq 
conference in Jerusalem (Playfair, 1992: 205). More recent socio-legal scholarship 
illustrates the strategic uses of Israeli trials to gain political advantage over 
Palestinians, as recently demonstrated by Allo (2016), and the structural challenges 
of legal resistance in this context (Weizman, 2016). Using legal procedure for 
political ends is a widespread phenomenon (Kirchheimer, 1961) not exclusive to the 
context of Israel/Palestine. Indeed, judicial rituals – including high court trials – 
mask deeper social functions of law: official procedures carry the ‘potential to 
dehumanize persons through the use of conceptual legal masks’, camouflaging the 
‘human significance’ and gravity of certain acts through the illusion that ‘legal 
reasoning will remain on a level of neutral abstraction’ (Weyrauch, 1978: 699-670). 
In other words, using legal proceedings to bolster the Israeli grip over Palestine is a 
more sophisticated tool of control and oppression than the use of military might.  
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The first part of the article will show how uncertain boundaries and the current 
political geography have enabled Israel – and consequently the ISC/HCJ – to enjoy 
a far-reaching jurisdiction over the West Bank. The second part will demonstrate 
how international laws applicable to the West Bank and their interpretation and 
implementation by Israel have created the conditions for a permanent regime of 
legalised control that has long outgrown the limits and exceptionality of temporary 
occupation. The third and final part will illustrate how the case of Khan-al-Ahmar 
typifies the notion of permanent regime of legalised control, by discussing some 
specific aspects of the ISC/HCJ extraterritorial jurisdiction in the West Bank, that 
encompass Bedouin communities and all matters involving settlement activity. 
More generally, this research seeks to widen the debate beyond the legitimising 
role of the ISC/HCJ in the military occupation of Palestine. Instead, this article 
interprets the permanent regime of legalised control in place as a route through 
which extraterritorial jurisdiction of a civilian court can construct sovereignty and 
facilitate annexation – above and beyond what can be envisaged through the 
simple notion of military occupation.  
A Regime of Soft Boundaries  
For the purpose of this study, the 1967 Green Line provides an indication as to what 
can be understood as Israel and as occupied Palestine, though neither party has 
formally accepted these borders. Yet crucially, the reality on the ground does not 
lend itself to a clear distinction between the two political entities. There are 
unanswered questions as to the Israeli political willingness to let go of the West 
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Bank; some scholars have alluded to the hope of part of the Israeli population to 
absorb the Palestinian territories, following the East Jerusalem model of unilateral 
annexation (Ratner, 2005: 700). Kretzmer (2002: 19) has summarised this 
ambiguity stating that ‘over the years Israeli governments pursued policies aimed 
at integration of the Occupied Territories with Israel while refraining from formally 
annexing the West Bank’. International law, and in particular the laws of armed 
conflict, has been used to facilitate Israeli control over the West Bank, giving rise to 
a ‘legal hypocrisy’ (Kretzmer, 2013): the land is not regarded by Israel as occupied, 
yet its Palestinian inhabitants are subject to the law of occupation. The prolonged 
occupation coupled with a complex system of Israeli control over Palestinian lives 
and facilitation of Israeli settler activity – in addition to security arrangements that 
give Israeli forces access to the whole of Palestine, and the ‘customs envelope’ that 
renders Palestine economically dependant on Israel (Del Sarto, 2015: 6) – 
problematizes the border question further. 
The notion of ‘borderlands’ introduced by Raffaella Del Sarto (2015: 6-7) helps 
uncouple ‘political and functional borders’ from ‘the boundaries of political 
communities across Israel-Palestine’. Her understanding of a system of open and 
closed borders ‘performing different functions’ seems to describe the practical 
realities of living in the West Bank. In this context, ‘Israel enjoys a monopoly over 
where and how to mark and enforce the boundaries between itself and 
Palestinians’ (Tawil-Souri, 2012: 173) and can enforce a regime of soft boundaries 
based on identity cards and residency permits that limit the freedom of movement 
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of Palestinians into, out of and within the West Bank. The exercise of the ISC/HCJ’s 
jurisdiction over the West Bank is evidently facilitated by these soft boundaries.   
Building on the 1993 Oslo Agreements, in Oslo II (1995) (Bauck and Omer, 2013) 
Palestine (excluding Gaza) was carved up into three areas based on the proposed 
division of powers and responsibilities to be shared between Israeli and Palestinian 
authorities (Art XI(3)). Area A, consisting of the main cities and townships in the 
West Bank, falls under Palestinian security and public order jurisdiction (Art XIII(1)), 
as well as for administrative and civil matters. In Area B Israel has ‘the overriding 
responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the 
threat of terrorism’ (Art XIII(2)(a)), while the Palestinian Police’ is ‘responsible for 
handling public order incidents in which only Palestinians are involved’ (Art 
XIII(2)(b)(2)), in close coordination with Israeli authorities. Non-security matters fall 
under Palestinian jurisdiction.   
The residual Area C, comprising over 60% of the territory of the West Bank (UN-
OCHA, 2014a: 1), has never been transferred to the Palestinian institutions as set 
out in Oslo II (Art XI(3)(c)) and related talks. As such, it remains under complete 
Israeli control for both security and civil matters, including law enforcement, 
planning and construction, which affect Palestinians, as well as Israelis living in 
settlements located in Area C and international aid agencies. According to UN-
OCHA figures approximately 300,000 Palestinians live in Area C (UN-OCHA, 
2014a), but they have to contend with two powerful Israeli interests. These include 
the so-called ‘firing zones’ and military areas (i.e. areas designated by the Israeli 
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army for training purposes (Diakonia, 2015), affecting around 6,200 Palestinian 
residents), and over 130 settlements and other outposts in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem in which Israelis (UN-OCHA, 2014a: 1) live in settlements considered 
illegal under international law (Diakonia, 2014) (the illegality of settlements was 
established in the ICJ Wall Case, paragraph 120). While no exact figures for Israeli 
settlers in the West Bank are available, UN-OCHA (2014a) reports a conservative 
figure of 341,000, while the Yesha Council (2016), the ‘umbrella governing 
organization of the Jewish communities of Judea and Samaria’ (the biblical names 
for the West Bank), reports that ‘at the end of 2015, the number of Israeli residents 
of Judea & Samaria reached 400,000 (not including another 210,000 Israelis living 
in Jerusalem's post-1967 neighborhoods)’, raising the numbers to over half a 
million.   
UN-OCHA has stated that ‘most of Area C has been allocated for the benefit of 
Israeli settlements, which receive preferential treatment at the expense of 
Palestinian communities’ (2014a). This is substantially the same position held by 
many Palestinian and Israeli human rights NGOs such as Al-Haq (2016) and 
B’Tselem (2013), as well as I-NGOs (HRW, 2010; Diakonia, 2013). In essence, the 
Israeli authorities administer the West Bank in their own national interest, 
regardless of Palestinian rights and status as protected persons clearly set out in 
international law (Art 27-34 and 47-78 GCIV, confirmed in Wall Case, paragraph 
101). According to previous studies on the ISC/HCJ jurisprudence involving the 
West Bank (Weill, 2015, Sultany, 2014, Kretzmer, 2002, Harpaz and Shany, 2010), 
the Israeli judiciary has substantially contributed to the situation. More generally, 
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observers outside law have spoken of ‘ethnocratic expansionism’ by Israel over 
Palestine and Palestinians (Yiftachel, 2006: 3-9). In this context, a paradoxical 
duality emerges as the Israeli authorities are intent on presenting their system as 
democratic and at the same time on enshrining ethno-national superiority of 
Jewish-Israeli citizens, including settlers, over Palestinians and Palestinian Israeli 
citizens, anywhere between the river Jordan and the Mediterranean sea. This 
hierarchy is especially visible in ‘Area C’, where Israeli law and practice has set out a 
hierarchical two-tier approach to governing Palestinians and Israelis.  
Prior to the Oslo II arrangements that designated the three areas, it had been 
argued that Israel conducts a meticulous administration of the West Bank and its 
Palestinian residents by citing security justifications. At the 1988 Al-Haq 
conference in Jerusalem Richard Falk and Burns H. Weston (1992: 136-139) argued 
that:  
Many of the legally dubious policies and practices pursued by Israel exceed the legitimate 
reach of military necessity and therefore may be associated more with suppressing 
Palestinian resistance to Israeli annexationist programmes (e.g. the establishment of 
settlements populated by Israeli Jews) than with safeguarding Israeli society. 
Writing at the same time, Playfair (1992: 223-224) echoed the concern that 
although ‘the occupying power has the right to carry out many actions, including 
some which would otherwise be in violation of international law’ to safeguard its 
security, those actions have come to embrace every aspect of Palestinian life. 
These considerations remain pertinent today, and can be contrasted with the 
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treatment of settlers in the West Bank. Israeli settlers enjoy preferential treatment 
as nationals of the occupying power, namely through application of domestic 
civilian Israeli law extraterritorially to them, while Palestinians in the same territory 
are subject to military law. Moreover, as Weill (2015: 13) has remarked, the ‘needs 
of the settlers have been legally translated as a security issue’, which results in 
strengthening their claims before the ISC/HCJ.  
From Occupation to a Permanent Regime of Legalised Control 
The ICJ has confirmed that Palestine – including the West Bank in its entirety – is 
considered under military occupation, and as such is governed by the Hague 
Convention and Regulations of 1907, as well as GCIV, as widely discussed in the 
literature (Imseis, 2003; Imseis, 2005; Kretzmer, 2005). The Wall Case also 
extended human rights obligations (including the ICCPR) to Israeli actions in 
Palestine, alongside the IHL duties of the occupying power. Yet the laws of military 
occupation that set out a temporary and exceptional regime of control over an 
occupied territory and population (Roberts, 1984; Greenwood, 1992; Sassòli, 2005; 
Benvenisti, 2012) become inadequate in the context of a prolonged and normalised 
situation of control (Roberts, 1990; Falk, 1989).  
The classic view that ‘occupation does not transfer sovereignty’ but only authority 
to govern temporarily presents occupation and annexation as distinct and 
‘mutually exclusive’ legal concepts (Pellet, 1992: 174-175). This dichotomy has been 
convincingly rejected by Martti Koskenniemi (2008: 32-35), in favour of a ‘sliding 
scale’ of governance, in which an extended occupation carries features of both 
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sovereignty and war. Moreover, some forms of occupation, termed occupatio 
bellica by Nehal Bhuta (2005: 725-726), more closely resemble an ‘intermediate 
status between invasion and conquest’. In this type of ‘transformative occupation’ 
an occupying power extends its exercise of temporary, factual (and militarily-
backed) authority, regulated under IHL, to the enjoyment of an ostensible 
sovereign power over an occupied territory: 
Like a sovereign dictatorship, transformative occupation exceeds the legal order that 
authorizes its provisional assumption of control. (Bhuta, 2005: 738)  
As the temporary military nature of the occupation fades, and a new order backed 
by permanent civilian judicial oversight is put in place by the occupying power to 
maintain control over the occupied territories and population, the overall picture 
begins to change. The permanent regime of legalised control enjoyed by Israel in 
the West Bank is an example of this.   
Israeli administrative powers over the West Bank are exercised firstly by the 
Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit (COGAT, 2015b), part 
of the general staff of the Ministry of Defence, in ‘coordination and conjunction 
with the Prime Minister's Office, other government ministries, the security forces 
and the IDF General Staff’. A branch of COGAT (2015a) is the Civil Administration 
in Judea and Samaria (i.e. West Bank or Palestine), an integral part of the Israeli 
Defence Forces (IDF). It describes its main tasks as ‘the civil and security 
coordination and liaison vis-à-vis the Palestinian entities’, exercising authority over 
‘zoning, construction and infrastructure’ and liaising with the ‘international 
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community on issues relating to humanitarian aid and the promotion of various 
initiatives in Judea and Samaria’.  
Two parallel legal regimes have been created for the two groups. Israeli settlers fall 
under ordinary Israeli civilian justice (Kretzmer, 2013; Gordon, 2008). In contrast, 
the administration of justice for Palestinians is through the Israeli military courts, in 
what has been described as a ‘process of judicial domination’ of the West Bank 
(Weill, 2007; Hajjar, 2005). In addition to the military courts and the residual 
Palestinian administration of justice over Palestinian-only disputes in Areas A and 
B, overall judicial oversight in the West Bank is exercised by the ISC/HCJ, a function 
described as ‘a central feature of Israel’s legal and political control over these 
territories’ (Kretzmer, 2002: 1). The ISC/HCJ’s ‘power to determine whether or not 
certain actions of the occupant serve the interest of the local population or are at 
any rate beneficial to such population’ has been long criticised (Cassese, 1992: 439-
440). Already at the 1988 Al-Haq conference in Jerusalem Antonio Cassese (1992) 
had argued that the court was not in a strong position ‘for determining whether or 
not certain measures of the occupant meet the needs of the local population’, 
because in a ‘democratic country’, ‘such a determination would naturally fall on the 
various representative bodies of the communities concerned’. Thus in hearing 
petitions that affect Palestinian rights and needs, the ISC/HCJ is unlikely to 
adjudicate fairly and impartially.  
Under administrative law, the ISC/HCJ exercises judicial review over the other 
branches of the Israeli state, and enjoys powers ‘in matters in which [the HCJ] 
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considers it necessary to grant relief in the interests of justice and which are not 
within the jurisdiction of any other court or tribunal’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2015). As such, pursuant to the overarching administrative supervision of 
the executive’s actions, including the military, and thus COGAT, the jurisdiction of 
ISC/HCJ judges extends to all Israeli activities in Palestine, access to which is 
entirely within the powers of Israel. Consequently, the ISC/HCJ enjoys de facto 
oversight over all of Palestine, although this is felt more incisively in Area C. 
Furthermore, the length of the occupation, the separation wall (Kattan, 2007), the 
growing numbers of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and the ISC/HCJ 
interpretations of IHL have deeply transformed the original context in which the 
laws of military occupation operate.  
The rules of IHL classify the local civilian population living under military 
occupation as protected persons, whom international law treats as individuals 
requiring additional safeguards in light of their precarious and vulnerable condition 
(Art 27-34 and 47-78 GCIV). In the West Bank, Palestinians are protected persons 
under IHL. Crucially, the GCIV excludes civilian nationals of the occupying power 
from these protections (Art 49(6)): Israeli settlers in the West Bank are thus clearly 
excluded. Yet as recalled by Shehadeh (1992: 165) Military Order 1213 (1987) 
granted the status of ‘local residents’ to settlers, an interpretation that had found 
favour in the ISC/HCJ jurisprudence since the 1970s (Kretzmer, 2002: 64-65). This 
military order ignores the prohibition of transfer of the occupying power’s own 
civilian population into occupied territory set out clearly in the GCIV, listed as a 
grave breach in Additional Protocol I (API) (Art 85(4)(a)), subsequently classified as 
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a war crime in the ICC Statute (Art 8(2)(b)(viii)), considered part of customary IHL 
(ICRC, 2006: Rule 130)). The ISC/HCJ, however, has generally endorsed this 
position held by the military and the state, resulting in the paradoxical protection 
of Israeli settlers through the Hague Regulations (Art 43) (Weill, 2014: 32-33) which 
distorts the purpose of IHL. Israeli settlers are thus protected on two effective 
bases, firstly, as members of the local population understood in IHL terms (i.e. as 
‘protected persons’), and secondly, as civilian nationals of the occupying power, 
enjoying rights and status of Israeli citizens extraterritorially. Yet notably, the same 
body of laws is used to restrict Palestinian freedoms, to the extent that the ISC/HCJ 
has interpreted their welfare as protected persons in a consistently narrow sense 
for quite some time (Playfair, 1992: 218-220). 
Kretzmer (2012) has provided a detailed analysis of ISC/HCJ jurisprudence on the 
‘military or security needs’ of the military commander that reflect the interests of 
the occupying power and its citizens. His interpretation seems consistent with the 
findings of the award-winning documentary ‘The Law in these Parts’ by Ra’anan 
Alexandrowicz (2011), in which senior members of the Israeli military and civilian 
judiciary talk frankly about their role as lawmakers and law enforcers administering 
the occupation. Among those interviewed, Ilan Katz (colonel, retired), Deputy 
Military Advocate General (2000-2003) states candidly: 
I think that, thanks to the Court, many of the military’s actions are legitimised […] [this] 
gives the action a legal seal of approval and makes it possible to keep doing it under the 
restrictions set by the Supreme Court. (Alexandrowicz, 2011: 56’51’’) 
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This quote highlights the special relationship between the ISC/HCJ and the 
military. And throughout the documentary, the extent to which this institutional 
complicity compromises the neutrality and impartiality of the ISC/HCJ in 
adjudicating over Palestinian issues remains a lingering question.  
A striking example of the continuum between the executive, the military and the 
ISC/HCJ is provided by the enforcement of the Israeli zoning and planning regime 
in Area C (Diakonia, 2013). The system in place provides extremely limited 
consultation opportunities for Palestinians affected, but it is open to settler 
committees as noted in studies since the 1980s (Rishmawi, 1992: 292; Home, 
2003). Under this regime, if a structure does not have the proper Israeli permit, it is 
likely to be given a demolition order, often justified on security grounds. 
Historically the requisition of Palestinian land supported by ISC/HCJ judgments has 
been used as a means to facilitate settler expansion (with some exceptions) 
(Playfair, 1992: 223-229). For a long time security justifications have facilitated the 
preservation and the expansion of Israeli hold over the West Bank, regardless of 
the IHL protections afforded to the local Palestinian communities (Playfair, 1992: 
229-230). This strategy has not changed over the past three decades, as the Khan-
al-Ahmar case demonstrates.  
An international fact-finding mission established by the UN Human Rights Council 
(UN-HRC, 2013a and 2013b) monitors the correlation between settlement 
expansion and the violation of international law and Palestinian human rights. Key 
concerns include the Israeli plans to relocate Bedouin communities to make room 
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for settlement expansion (UN-OCHA, 2014b), as shown in the Khan-al-Ahmar 
judgment, and the route of the separation wall that juts into the West Bank to 
ensure the majority of settlements remain connected to Israel proper (UN-OCHA, 
2014c; B’Tselem, 2011) regardless of the impact on Palestinian communities (as 
shown in the recent Battir and Cremisan cases at the ISC/HCJ). This illustrates how 
the entrenchment of a permanent regime of legalised control enables Israel to 
dispose of the West Bank and its Palestinian inhabitants as it pleases. The 
following section considers some of the themes emerging from the Khan-al-Ahmar 
decision and how they demonstrate the creeping annexationist effects of the 
permanent regime of legalised control. 
The Jurisdiction over Khan-al-Ahmar 
The exercise and modalities of jurisdictional oversight by the ISC/HCJ over the 
West Bank emerging from the case of Khan-al-Ahmar typify the entrenchment of 
Israeli power over Palestinians. The dispute focused on the lack of planning 
permission for the Bedouin school, the basis of the demolition order. According to 
the petitioning Kfar Adumim settlers, the failure to demolish the school violated 
their private property, as they planned to expand their settlement to the Khan-al-
Ahmar site. In its response, the Ministry of Defence, with whom the ISC/HCJ 
eventually sided, stated instead that the school fell on Israeli state land, which was 
not privately owned by the settlement and dismissed claims that Kfar Adumim had 
any property rights over that area. There was no mention of the rights of the 
Bedouin community to live in their village and keep their community school. The 
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Bedouins were marginalised in the proceedings and silenced in the final hearing. 
Their fate was decided in a foreign court, in a foreign language, in a dispute they 
were not directly party to.    
As Khan-al-Ahmar falls within Area C of the West Bank, it is subject to the Israeli 
planning regime (Diakonia, 2013). All building activity as well as structural 
maintenance is regulated de facto by Israel on the basis of its interpretations of IHL 
and local laws applicable at the start of the occupation (including British mandate 
planning rules of the 1940s and Jordanian laws of the 1960s). In 1967, when the 
Israeli Military Commander obtained civil and military powers in the West Bank, all 
planning activities were centralised under the Israeli military and thus the executive 
(Diakonia, 2013: 38, citing in particular Military Order 418 (1971)).  
With regards to the specific geopolitics of the location, Khan-al-Ahmar is adjacent 
to the expanding Israeli settlement of Kfar Adumim, in the area referred to as ‘E1’ 
by the Israeli planning authorities (B’Tselem, 2012). If completed, E1 will form a 
ring of Israeli settlements around Palestinian east Jerusalem, consequently 
enclosing the Palestinian Jerusalemites (on both sides of the separation wall) 
within Israeli settlements. The demolition orders in Khan-al-Ahmar are to be 
understood in the broader context of the Israeli plan to relocate Bedouin 
communities out of the area east of Jerusalem to make way for settlement 
expansion. If the plan to remove the Bedouins from their current location to other 
parts of the West Bank goes ahead, it will give rise to concerns forcible transfer of 
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civilians (UN-OCHA, 2014b: 1), prohibited by the GCIV (Art 49 and 147) and the ICC 
Statute (Art 7(1)(d) – crime against humanity).  
The ISC/HCJ’s decision not to uphold the demolition order, but defer to the 
political decision of the Knesset, gives the Khan-al-Ahmar community temporary 
respite. Yet the court’s conduct in this case reveals how the permanent regime of 
legalised control subjects the fate of the affected Bedouin communities to Israeli 
judicial and political decisions. Palestinian voices (be they institutions or 
community representatives) remain structurally marginalised in all Israeli contexts. 
The West Bank Bedouins in Area C thus find themselves governed by lawmakers 
they cannot elect and judged by a foreign court system willing to defer to its own 
domestic politics. In this context, the ISC/HCJ entrenches the permanent regime of 
legalised control over the West Bank, exercising almost unimpeded extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over the Bedouins in Area C, as if fully within Israeli sovereignty.   
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction  
The laws of armed conflict, Israeli military orders and courts, and the judicial 
oversight exercised by the ISC/HCJ have provided the political and practical basis 
for a form of Israeli extraterritorial jurisdiction over the West Bank that is inching 
closer to de facto sovereignty, described in this article as a permanent regime of 
legalised control. To the casual observer, the quiet judicial oversight of the ISC/HCJ 
in the West Bank does not match the aggression associated with military convoys 
and armed confrontations that come to mind when thinking of military occupation 
or unilateral annexation by force. Yet the court’s role is no less controversial: by 
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affirming its jurisdiction over matters involving Palestinians, it is imposing a more 
subtle form of Israeli control. Radical commentators may even term it ‘sovereignty 
creep’ – which is harder to detect. In the absence of clearly demarcated borders 
between Palestine and Israel, the ISC/HCJ helps ensure permanent Israeli presence 
through its civil jurisdiction, exercised over most aspects of Palestinian life by 
virtue of living under military occupation. When key Israeli national interests are at 
stake, such as in the greater Jerusalem area, the possibility of deference to 
parliamentary politics in judicial review proceedings demonstrate that the judiciary 
is willing to follow the Knesset and the executive line on what to do in Palestine.  
Khan-al-Ahmar is situated in the E1 area to the east of Jerusalem, within close 
proximity to the Kfar Adumim settlement, nestled between the Ma’ale Adumim 
settlement and a major satellite industrial area (UN-OCHA, 2011). All of these 
locations fall east of the Green Line and of the Israeli-declared Jerusalem borders in 
Area C. The Bedouin village flanks Highway 1, an Israeli-built motorway that 
connects the Jordan Valley (in Palestine) to East Jerusalem and onwards to Tel 
Aviv, cutting across the Palestinian Territories and enabling unimpeded access to 
Israeli-registered vehicles between the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea. The 
visual impact of the place is striking: a handful of makeshift huts, some animal 
pens, a school and a few other non-permanent structures partly provided by 
international donors (as part of their humanitarian efforts), sliced by a fast 3-lane 
motorway serving two hilltop settlements that tower over Khan-al-Ahmar. The 
tiny Bedouin community seems out of place next to these mammoth modern 
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structures, almost waiting to disappear under the might of its neighbours, whose 
demographic growth and energy consumption rise steadily.  
A legal analysis of this picture brings this context into perspective: the settlements 
are considered illegal under international law (though Israel disputes this, as set 
out in the 2012 Levy Committee Report). Art 49 GCIV states that ‘the Occupying 
Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the 
territory it occupies’. The UN Human Rights Council (Resolution 19/17 (2012), 
among other UN documents) has stated clearly that Israeli settlements in the 
Palestinian territories are illegal, following the ICJ’s analysis in the Wall Case 
(paragraph 120). Therefore, the ISC/HCJ’s position giving effect to the alleged legal 
interests of the settlers over territory inhabited by Palestinian Bedouins in the 
West Bank demonstrates contempt of international law. That court, pursuant to its 
jurisdictional reach over the Palestinian Territories through IHL, can rely on two 
paradoxical ways to protect the political interests of the state of Israel – through 
settler presence – over Palestine. Firstly, its practice of including Israeli settlers 
within the categories of civilians gives them a ‘legalised’ presence within the 
Palestinian territories under the laws of military occupation – although this is based 
on a flawed Israeli interpretation of IHL (as discussed earlier). And secondly, 
granting administrative standing to settlers vis-à-vis the Israeli authorities renders 
the legal relationship between settlers and the Israeli state ordinary and equivalent 
to that of other Israeli citizens – although this relationship plays out outside the 
formal territorial sovereignty of Israel. The ISC/HCJ’s approach fails to recognise 
that the territory in which settlers reside does not fall within the boundaries of the 
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state, nor that the settlements have been recognised as illegal under international 
law; yet its jurisdiction applies to them as if they were ordinary Israeli citizens living 
within full territorial sovereignty. The affirmation of Israeli interests in controlling 
that portion of land is more important than the welfare of Palestinian Bedouins 
living in villages in Area C protected under IHL.  
In its wider context this case illustrates the extent of the entrenchment of Israeli 
control over Palestine and Palestinians through civilian means, transforming the 
nature of the occupation into a more permanent regime of legalised control, which 
is most visible in Area C of the West Bank. The ISC/HCJ’s deference to politics, 
moreover, indicates its inextricable link to the other Israeli branches of power, 
enabling civilian officials – included elected representatives – in Israel to decide the 
fate of a community of Palestinian Bedouins whose voices are structurally 
marginalised in all Israeli institutions. If the judicial oversight of the West Bank falls 
within the jurisdiction of the ISC/HCJ, who in turn may defer to the Knesset, it 
could be concluded that Palestinians are disempowered subjects of a court, a 
parliament and an executive they cannot vote nor hold accountable in any effective 
manner. This raises important questions about the extent to which the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the ISC/HCJ in the West Bank, teamed with other 
non-military measures of control (albeit backed by military might), is transforming 
the occupation of Palestine into a reality that is inching towards annexation 
through civilian means.  
Jurisdiction over Bedouins in the West Bank 
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In procedural terms, the Khan-al-Ahmar dispute is between a group of Israeli 
citizens, who happen to reside in the Kfar Adumim settlement deemed illegal 
under international law, and their State (Ministry of Defence and subsidiary 
offices). It looks like an ordinary administrative case in which the petitioners 
demand that the state respondents carry out a previously issued order (demolition 
order), the delay of which allegedly violates their rights or affects their legal 
interests (namely, the planned settlement expansion). In an ordinary setting within 
the jurisdictional boundaries of a given domestic court, this would be a fairly 
straightforward administrative trial. Yet the petitioners requested the ISC/HCJ to 
judicially review the non-execution by the Israeli authorities of pending demolition 
orders over structures in a Palestinian Bedouin village in the West Bank – the 
property of non-Israelis, outside Israel.  
The residents of Khan-al-Ahmar are members of the Jahalin tribe, a Bedouin group 
from the Negev desert (now within Israel) who fled to the West Bank after 1948 
(Jamjoum, 2008/2009: 27; NRC, 2015). Many Negev Bedouins in the West Bank 
hold refugee status under international law, providing an additional layer of 
protection (UNRWA, 2013). Israeli plans to move these communities amount to 
transfer of civilians, described by one author ‘an effective means to secure the 
fruits of conquest or aggression to the detriment of the civilian population’ 
(Meindersma, 1994: 31). The transfer of Bedouins from one location to another in 
the West Bank raises serious questions around the issue of forced displacement, 
described as prohibited under customary IHL (ICRC, 2006: Rule 129). The Israeli 
authorities’ attitudes towards the relocation of the Khan-al-Ahmar community 
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does not uphold the occupying power’s obligations to protect the civilian 
population under its military control (GCIV Art 49, transfer, and Art 53, destruction 
of property). Additionally, the fact that the demolition order includes a school 
interferes with the protection of children as a particularly vulnerable group living 
under occupation (Art 50 GCIV). 
In light of the applicable legal framework, in a public statement undersigned at a 
‘Bedouin Transfer Roundtable’ in early 2015, Marco Sassòli and other international 
law scholars recalled that the Bedouin in Area C are protected persons living under 
occupation (Bedouin Transfer Roundtable, 2015: 1). Possible exceptions under IHL 
do not apply, because ‘there are no ongoing hostilities to justify an exception to 
the prohibition of forced transfer’ and the plan proposed by the Israelis is intended 
to be permanent. The remaining question is whether the transfer is forcible. Sassòli 
interprets this broadly, in a manner which is not ‘restricted to physical force’ and 
which takes into account ‘the coercive circumstances in which the Bedouin live’ 
that renders ‘their true consent to the transfer’ impossible (Bedouin Transfer 
Roundtable, 2015: 2). The legal experts at the roundtable concluded that a transfer 
would be forcible thus amounting to a grave breach of GCIV. The public statement 
also highlighted that the communities targeted by the relocation plan - including 
the Khan-al-Ahmar community - ‘live on land earmarked for the E1 settlement 
construction plan and completion of the Wall about the Ma’ale Adummim 
settlement bloc’ (Bedouin Transfer Roundtable, 2015: 1), which brings to the fore 
the link between displacement of the local population and emplacement of settlers 
already discussed.  
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The conclusions of that roundtable build on a previous expert opinion on the 
displacement of Bedouin communities, in which Théo Boutruche and Marco 
Sassòli (2014) provide a more detailed analysis of the transfer of the population of 
an occupied territory under API (Art 85(4)(a)). And while that expert opinion 
acknowledges that Israel is not a party to that treaty, it indicates API as ‘the most 
recent codification of existing war crimes’, also reflected in the ICC Statute (Art 
8(2)(a)(vii) and Art 8(2)(b)(viii)). Boutrouche and Sassòli argue that the API ‘clarifies 
the content of the grave breach of forcible transfer by explicitly criminalising this 
form of displacement within the occupied territory’ and, importantly, links it to the 
occupying power’s transfer of parts of its own population into the occupied 
territories. In the West Bank context, this refers to settlement expansion policies 
endorsed by the state of Israel, which is one of the main drivers for the 
displacement of the local communities.  
The exercise of Israeli jurisdiction over Bedouin communities seems to include the 
power to order and implement transfer across the West Bank. The treatment of 
the Bedouins in the E1 area by Israeli authorities area reflects the treatment of the 
Negev Bedouin by the Israeli authorities (Falah, 1985; Falah, 1989; Shamir, 1996; 
Yiftachel, 2003; Nasasra, Richter-Devroe, Abu-Rabia-Queder and Ratcliffe, 2014). 
Both communities, in the Negev and in the West Bank, have been subject to 
multiple displacements and other acts that have altered their way of life. The main 
difference between these two situations is the legal regime applicable. In the 
Negev, the Bedouin are Israeli citizens with, in principle, the possibility of holding 
the state accountable for human rights violations through ordinary proceedings. In 
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the West Bank, an occupied territory under international law, the Bedouins are not 
citizens but enjoy the further protections of IHL, which includes the prohibition of 
forcible transfer of a protected civilian population living under occupation (Art 49 
GCIV), exceptionally and temporarily derogable ‘if the security of the population or 
imperative military reasons so demand’. The only way for these Bedouins to 
oppose an Israeli military order, for example a demolition order or the order to 
leave their homes and relocate, is to appeal to the ISC/HCJ. But as demonstrated in 
the Khan-al-Ahmar case, Palestinians are marginalised in those proceedings. 
Moreover, the prospect of realisation of human rights and IHL protections before 
that court becomes vain when the judges have the option to defer to the political 
establishment, as demonstrated in the Khan-al-Ahmar decision.  
The Khan-al-Ahmar case illustrates how deeply Bedouin communities in the West 
Bank are vulnerable to Israeli politics to which the ISC/HCJ is willing to defer. It also 
shows the peripheral role in both the legal proceedings and political debates 
afforded to Palestinian Bedouins living in the West Bank. The absence of any 
genuine Israeli effort to ensure Palestinian participation and representation in 
matters pertaining to the community’s survival in its present location was 
evidenced in the dynamics of the court proceedings as well as the political process, 
as if that portion of land and its inhabitants fell within the sovereignty of the Israeli 
parliament. This was made apparent in the ISC/HCJ’s rejection of the petition and 
decision not to adjudicate on the grounds that the Israeli authorities were actively 
pursuing alternative solutions at political level to relocate the Bedouin community 
from Khan-al-Ahmar to Nweimeh (close to Jericho) (Hass, 2014), where more 
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adequate infrastructure and educational facilities would be provided. The Bedouins 
of the Khan-al-Ahmar case, however, enjoyed little political agency in this process, 
while being subject to the decisions of the Israeli judiciary and politicians.  
Jurisdiction over Settlement Activity 
The subject-matter of the dispute goes beyond the demolition of the tyre school in 
Khan-al-Ahmar and reaffirms the ISC/HCJ’s jurisdiction over matters pertaining to 
settlements in the West Bank. Israeli settlers are not considered differently to 
Israeli citizens west of the Green Line by Israeli authorities. They are treated as 
ordinary citizens whose administrative standing vis-à-vis the state (and the 
ISC/HCJ) is equal to that of residents of Israel proper. In the political climate of 
official Israeli expansionism into the West Bank, demonstrated by the 
government’s continued approval of settlements – described by the UN chief as 
‘provocative acts’ (Ban Ki-Moon, 2016) – settler communities take on a strategic 
role of forerunners of territorial (re)conquest and control. The availability of a 
group of Jewish-heritage Israelis willing to settle on Palestinian land (for a variety 
of religious, ideological and economic reasons (Maidhof, 2014)) and live a relatively 
ordinary life reinforces the notion of Israeli ownership and entitlement. Their 
presence also shifts the role of the IDF in the West Bank from a purely offensive 
army to that of a defensive function in protecting settler life from the competing 
stance local Palestinian population. Consequently, the settlers become agents of 
the state in maintaining control over land, much like armies in traditional warfare, 
leaving the IDF to police the area.  
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The relationship between the IDF (and the Israeli authorities more generally) and 
the settlers has been sometimes described as ‘symbiotic’ (Peled, 2012: 87). While 
for the most part this seems assessment is realistic - Israel indeed provides 
economic subsidies, infrastructure (roads, connection to power and water grids), 
the full range of services (schools, hospitals) and military protection to West Bank 
settlements, as well as full citizenship rights to settlers - the relationship between 
settlers and the Israeli state is more complex, as evidenced in the rise of settler 
movements that oppose the state authority. Settler violence against Palestinians is 
growing dramatically, and even attacks towards the IDF are not infrequent (Byman 
and Sachs: 2012). The Khan-al-Ahmar case is to be understood in light of these 
growing tensions between groups of settlers and the state of Israel, played out 
extraterritorially in the West Bank. And while the dispute falls under administrative 
law, its substance reflects the internal political struggle between the Israeli 
authorities and a disgruntled group of citizens demanding greater support for 
settlement expansion. Accordingly, Palestinian Bedouin communities affected by 
this dispute are marginal to it.  
The legitimate claims of Palestinians, whose land and resources have been taken 
and disposed of to enable and assist the settlements over the past decades, are not 
central to the Khan al-Ahmar case. As an organ of the Israeli state, the ISC/HCJ is 
unable to act as an impartial watchdog over the occupying power’s administration 
of occupied land. Confirmation of the ISC/HCJ operating in close coordination with 
the Knesset, the IDF and other state bodies was made apparent in the minutes of 
the meeting of the Knesset Judea and Samaria Region Subcommittee of the 
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Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (2014) discussing the so-called ‘Illegal 
Palestinian construction in Arec C’ on 27 April 2014. That document lists various 
representatives across the institutional spectrum - which included delegates from 
the HCJ - involved in the discussion of the official Israeli policy to remove 
Palestinian Bedouins and demolish structures in their communities in Area C. 
Officials in that Committee used the language of crime and punishment, revealing 
their fierce antagonism towards the UN and other international donors providing 
humanitarian aid (shelters, wells, toilets, electrical cables etc.) to Bedouin 
communities due to be relocated under Israeli plans.  
More worryingly, ISC/HCJ judges who live in settlements have been involved in 
hearings about demolition orders in Bedouin villages, such as Justice Noam 
Sohlberg who ‘gave the army a green light to expel an entire Palestinian village just 
happens to live in a nearby settlement’ as reported by Dror Etkes (2015). And while 
his appointment in 2012 had been contested initially by critics of the Yesh Gvul 
movement who argued that residents of settlements could not serve as Supreme 
Court justices, given the possible conflict of interests arising in petitions involving 
the West Bank, the High Court rejected the claim (Zarchin, 2012). In its current 
formation, it seems unlikely that the ISC/HCJ would consider the illegality of 
settlements under international law problematic.  
Returning to the Khan-al-Ahmar case, the final decision of April 2014 reaffirms the 
court’s jurisdiction in the West Bank as well as the state of Israel’s exercise of 
civilian sovereignty demonstrated through the Knesset’s powers to draft and 
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approve master plans over Palestine and Palestinians, including the transfer of 
Bedouins. By deferring to a political solution, the ISC/HCJ endorsed the tacit 
understanding that the West Bank (and Area C in particular) falls within Israeli 
reach, to be administered and disposed of according to national interests, 
regardless of the wellbeing and rights of the local Palestinian civilian population set 
out in IHL. The realities of the prolonged occupation, cemented by over half a 
million Israeli settlers in the West Bank and the jurisdictional oversight of the 
ISC/HCJ, have consolidated a permanent regime of legalised control. Given that 
the vast majority of the West Bank does not fall under the jurisdiction of 
Palestinian laws and courts, the ISCJ/HCJ exercises virtually unimpeded 
jurisdiction. As such, the ISC/HCJ is assisting the aims of a form of transformative 
occupation, facilitating the creeping annexationist effects of the permanent 
regime of legalised control that further undermine the prospect of a viable 
independent Palestine state and the protection of Palestinian rights.  
Conclusion  
Over nearly half a century the context and effects of prolonged occupation have 
transformed the nature of Israeli military occupation over the West Bank into a 
permanent regime of legalised control. The far-reaching jurisdiction of the ISC/HCJ 
over Palestinian matters, as demonstrated in the Khan-al-Ahmar case, points to a 
situation of transformative occupation, which is radically altering the temporary, 
exceptional nature of Israeli military control. The judicial oversight of the ISC/HCJ 
in the West Bank and the possibility to defer to political solutions decided in the 
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Knesset – in the absence of defined borders – enables Israel to enjoy unimpeded 
authority over Palestine, and in particular in Area C of the West Bank, in a manner 
that suggests annexation creep.  
This study widens the debate beyond the legitimising role of the ISC/HCJ in the 
military occupation of Palestine that dominates the critical literature. Instead, it 
interprets the permanent regime of legalised control as a route through which the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the ISC/HCJ as a civilian court can construct 
sovereignty and facilitate the annexation of the West Bank. Using the law and the 
expansionist jurisdiction of a supreme court, backed by military might, as a tool of 
territorial conquest is less likely to result in the same criticism that a military 
invasion would attract. Reflecting on the significance of the Khan-al-Ahmar 
judgment, this article considers how the ISC/HCJ’s unimpeded jurisdiction over the 
West Bank and Palestinians, teamed with its institutional relationship with the 
Israeli state, contributes to the gradual shift of military occupation towards 
sovereignty, to the detriment of individual Palestinian rights as well as Palestinian 
territorial integrity.  
The debate, therefore, has moved forward from lamenting that the Israeli 
Supreme Court in High Court of Justice formation legitimates the military 
occupation of Palestine. Instead, cases like Khan-al-Ahmar reveal an even more 
ambiguous role of the ISC/HCJ in transforming the occupation of Palestine into 
something more permanent, less overtly military and more civilised, treating 
Palestinian land as if it were Israeli, and dealing with Bedouins as if they were 
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disposable human beings who can be moved to make way for settlement 
expansion and territorial (re)conquest. By recognising that the law and its formal 
proceedings in this context conceal such abusive consequences, we are reminded 
to return to politics.    
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